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The principle of protection by procedural due process is more easily
recognized at public universities because they are similar to state agencies
and as such must follow constitutional rules of procedural due process.2"
The area of higher education is of such vital public concern that its
deprivation by any authority should be predicated upon conformity to
constitutional guarantees of procedural due process. In recognition of the
seriousness of expulsions for misconduct a tentative statement of policy
has been forwarded by the American Association of University Professors
which calls for both notice and hearing without mention of different
standards for private as opposed to public schools.26 Although strict
procedural requirements are not necessary, the lack of notice and hearing,
as in the instant case, are ample grounds for relief for a violation of due
process and should be considered as such both at public and private universities.
TIMOTHY G. ANAGNOST

THE CORPORATION AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
The Plaintiff, a corporation, filed a complaint signed by the plaintiff's
president above the name of the corporation. 1 Defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and to strike the complaint
upon the ground that it had not been signed by a licensed attorney.2 The
plaintiff then moved to amend the complaint by striking the name of the
corporation and the signature of its president and inserting the signature
of counsel. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike the
complaint and denied the plaintiff's motion to amend on the ground that a
corporation cannot appear or sign a pleading in proper person and that a
complaint which was signed by the president of a corporation who was not
an attorney' was a nullity and therefore not amendable. On appeal, held,
affirmed: a complaint filed by a plaintiff corporation through its president,
which does not bear the signature of an attorney, is a nullity and may not
be amended after the expiration of the statutory time for foreclosing a
25. "[N)or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. Statement on the Academic Freedom of Students, 51 A.A.U.P. 447, 449 (1965).
1. The record indicates that the complaint was actually prepared by a licensed attorney
who would not sign it. No reason was given for his refusal to sign.
2. Rule 1.5 of the Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, in effect at the time of the filing of
this case, provides in part:
(a) Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in his individual name . . ..
3. The fact that the corporation's president was not an attorney was not discussed in
the appellate court's opinion. The question does not appear to have been considered.
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lien4 by striking the name of the plaintiff corporation and the signature of
its president and affixing in lieu thereof the signature of counsel who
appeared for the plaintiff after the filing of the complaint. Nicholson
Supply Co. v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association, 184 So.2d 438
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
A Corporation, though in reality an artificial entity, is regarded by
the law as a natural person for many purposes.' As such, it is entitled to
many of the rights and privileges guaranteed to persons by constitutions,
statutes or other legal provisions, unless the subject matter under consideration deals explicitly with natural persons only. Where there is doubt
concerning the applicability to artificial persons, the answer is necessarily
obtained by judicial interpretation.6 Therefore, it is generally held that a
corporation, while not entitled to the protections granted to citizens under
the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, 7 may
claim most of the benefits afforded by the due process clause of the same
amendment, particularly where property rights are concerned.' In most
states, corporations are given the constitutional or statutory right to sue
and be sued in the corporate name.'
In one important respect, however, the artificial person is not entitled
to a right normally granted under the due process clause. The rule appears
to be universally adopted that a corporation may not practice law.' 0 This
is the common law rule" which stems from an early judicial distrust of
the corporate entity and the profit-minded men who directed them." The
prohibition is based upon the judiciary's idea that an attorney must have
specialized knowledge, skill and training, and be able to maintain a
relationship of trust and confidence with his client while being directly
4. Evidently, the time for foreclosing the lien passed while the appeal was pending.
No mention is made of the time element in the trial court's holding.
5. 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 7 (perm. ed. rev. 1963).
6. The general rule of construction is that the term "person" is generic and will include
both artificial and natural persons whenever this is necessary to give effect to the reason
and spirit of the provision. Id.
7. E.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
8. E.g., Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); Freidus v. Freidus,
89 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1956).
9. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 608.13 (1965); ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 4(b); 6 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 2485 (perm. ed. rev. 1950).
10. E.g., Osborn v. Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)

738 (1824); 6 FLETCHER, supra note 9,

§ 2524.
11. Brandstein v. White Lamps, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); 1 E. COKE,
COMSENTARY UPON LITTLETON, § 90 (Ist Amer. Ed. 1853).

12. Were it possible for corporations to prosecute or defend actions in person,
through their own officers, men unfit by character and training, men, whose
credo is that the end justifies the means, disbarred lawyers or lawyers of other
jurisdictions would soon create opportunities for themselves as officers of certain
classes of corporations and then freely appear in our courts as a matter of pure
business, not subject to the ethics of our profession or the supervision of our bar
associations and the discipline of our courts.
Mortgage Comm'n v. Great Neck Improvement Co., 162 Misc. 416, 423, 295 N.Y.S. 107,
114 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
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subject to the court's discipline."8 These requirements cannot be fulfilled
by a corporation.
The courts, while agreeing that corporations cannot practice law,
have not been able to agree as to what acts constitute the practice of law.' 4
The widest divergence has come when the practices complained of are
carried on outside the courtroom.' 5 Some jurisdictions have decided that
the artificial entity, like the natural person, may perform acts which
would constitute legal practice when the benefit is solely for the corporation.'" The reasoning appears to be that no harm will come to the
public since any injury caused by error will be borne only by the corporation. 7 A number of other courts, however, have held that any acts
performed for the corporation, or for others, which constitute the practice
of law (according to the particular court's definition), are prohibited.' 8
Apparently, this distinction is based on the belief that an act done solely
for the corporation's own benefit will eventually affect other persons in
some way. 9 Other jurisdictions have allowed some legal services to be
performed if they were insubstantial and incidental to commercial
services normally provided by the corporation. 2" Most courts have
generally held, however, that there is no valid distinction between simple
and complex legal tasks.2 '
A different problem arises when a corporation attempts to invoke any
of the court's mechanisms or processes. When this occurs, the rule forbid13. In re The Florida Bar, 133 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1961); West Virginia State Bar v.
Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959).
14. "[A]nyone who assumes the role of assisting the court in its processes or who
invokes the use of its mechanisms is considered to be engaged in the practice of law." Arkansas
State Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 51, 273 S.W.2d 408, 411 (1954). "The
question is whether the defendants, acting through employees, performed acts, in or out of
court, commonly understood to be the practice of law." State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 229, 140 A.2d 863, 870 (1958). The lower court had
held that, in order to constitute the practice of law, the acts must be performed for someone
else. 20 Conn. Supp. 248, 131 A.2d 646 (1957). See also Merrick v. American Security &
Trust Co. 107 F.2d 271, 278 (1939), and The Florida Bar v. Keehley, 190 So.2d 173 (Fla.
1966).
15. See Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 184 (1962); Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 404 (1960); Annot., 53
A.L.R.2d 788 (1957).
16. State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 336 P.2d 1 (1961). See
Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954) ; Battelle Memorial Institute v.
Green, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 173 N.E.2d 201 (C.P. 1960).
17. Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d 1011 (1957) ; New
Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey Mortgage Associates, 34 N.J. 305, 169
A.2d 150 (1961).
18. Devine v. Watauga Hosp., 137 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1956); State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958).
19. Cases cited note 18 supra.
20. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 397 (Ky.
App. 1961). Oregon State Bar v. John H. Milton Co., 235 Ore. 341, 385 P.2d 181 (1963).
The Kentucky case indicates that the amount of the fee charged to the customer may
assist the court in determining whether the defendant is engaged in the practice of law.
21. E.g., People v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 378, 125 N.E. 666, 670 (1919)
(Pound, J., concurring opinion); see Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., Ill. 2d
116, 214 N.E.2d 771 (1966).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXI

ding the corporate practice of law has been consistently applied.22 In this
situation, there is no subtle overlapping of commercial and legal services
and no argument of whether the practice of law is involved; the corporation stands before the court. The prohibition has frequently been enforced in the face of a legislative act purporting to extend such privileges to
previously unauthorized persons or groups.23 Although some courts have
allowed the statutory authorization to stand, 4 most have ruled that it is
within the inherent province of the judiciary to prescribe the qualifications
for admission to the practice of law. 25 However, by statutory exception
to the general rule, some jurisdictions have permitted corporations to
appear in proper person before courts which are not of record.26 Many law
firms have incorporated under recent statutes enacted to allow attorneys
to incorporate so that federal income tax benefits might be realized.2 7
Although the decisions have generally held that a corporation may
not appear before the court in propria persona, it is evident that this
frequently happens. When the fact has been objected to by the opposing
party or recognized by the court, a problem arises as to what effect this
improper presence will have upon the proceedings or any judgments
previously rendered. Many judges have stated that all of the proceedings
are void, and some have so held.2" However, in many cases, the court
has perceived the presence of the unrepresented corporation but allowed
the action to continue with a binding effect upon the parties..2 9 In other
22. E.g., Flora Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 307 F.2d 413 (10th Cir. 1962);
Heiskell v. Moizie, 82 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ; Ashley-Cooper Sales Services, Inc. v.
Brentwood Mfg. Co., 168 F. Supp. 742 (D. Md. (1958); Laskowitz v. Shellenberger, 107

F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Paradise v. Nowlin, 86 Cal. App. 2d 897, 195 P.2d 867
(1948); Carter v. Trevathan, 309 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. App. 1958); Lonya Realty Corp. v.
Montes, 281 App. Div. 238, 113 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1952).
23. Frazee v. Citizens Fid. Bank, 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. App. 1965); R. E. Harrington,
Inc. v. Windmiller, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 562, 177 N.E.2d 816 (Columbus Mun. Ct. 1961)

(administrative ruling) ; West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420
(1959).
24. Burgess v. Federated Credit Serv., Inc., 148 Colo. 8, 365 P.2d 264 (1961) ; In re
The Florida Bar, 133 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1961); Dixon v. Reliable Loans, Inc., 112 Ga. App.
618, 145 S.E.2d 771 (1965).

25. E.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961);
State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958);
cases cited note 24 supra.
26. Paradise v. Nowlin, 86 Cal. App. 2d 897, 195 P.2d 867 (1948) ; Burgess v. Federated
Credit Serv., Inc., 148 Colo. 8, 365 P.2d 264 (1961) ; Dixon v. Reliable Loans, Inc., 112

Ga. App. 618, 145 S.E.2d 771 (1965); Tuttle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's Ass'n, 10 Utah 2d
195, 350 P.2d 616 (1960). What happens when the case goes up on appeal from the nonrecord court? The Dixon case indicates that the corporation may continue to represent
itself. The Paradise case is contra.
27. Compare In re The Florida Bar, 133 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1961), with State ex. rel. Green
v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962).

28. Brandstein v. White Lamps, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Lonya Realty
Corp. v. Montes, 281 App. Div. 238, 113 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1952) ; People v. Weiner, 3 Misc.
2d 794, 160 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Magis. Ct. N.Y.C. 1956). See United States v. Crosby, 24 F.R.D.

15 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Laskowitz v. Shellenberger, 107 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
29. Schifrin v. Chenille Mfg. Co., 117 F.2d 92

(2d Cir, 1941).

In several cases, the

unrepresented corporation was allowed to continue its action and, upon receiving an un-
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instances, the court has noted that it has the authority to dismiss the action
but has granted the corporation time to obtain an attorney on the ground
that dismissal is a drastic remedy which is unduly harsh under normal
circumstances. 3 ' Thus, although many judges have indicated that such
proceedings might be void, it is not often that they have so ruled. 1
The instant case leaves many questions unanswered. Although it is
clear that the court considered the complaint filed by the corporation to be
an unamendable nullity, it is not clear that the ruling would have been the
same if the subscribing corporate president had been an attorney or if the
statute of limitations had not been involved. 2 In holding that the complaint is void, the Florida court has adopted a rule which finds most of its
authority in dictum. Further, the decision appears to be contrary to the
Florida rule requiring liberality of amendment to complaints when the
basic cause of action is not thereby altered. If, as indicated by the language
of the holding, the ruling was based partly on the fact that the time for
foreclosing the lien had passed, the court did not follow the established
view that amendments relate back to the time the original complaint was
filed when a statute of limitations would otherwise preclude the action.
Florida has placed itself squarely within the oft-stated rule that
a corporation cannot practice law.3 1 It is submitted that the rule forbidding corporations from appearing in proper person before the courts is
justified and should be followed in Florida. However, it is also submitted
that a complaint signed by an unknowing corporative official should be
treated in the same manner as any other defective pleading. The corporation should be granted an opportunity to correct its mistake in accordance with the applicable rules of procedure.
The decision in the instant case is especially harsh because the corporation is precluded from any further action since the time for foreclosure
has passed. The central issue is not whether a corporation has a right to
practice law, but whether it has a right to amend a defective complaint.
ROGER A. BRIDGES
favorable decision, attempted to have the ruling set aside on the ground that it was void
because of its own lack of representation. The courts have refused to accept the argument.
30. In one case the judge stated that dismissal would be particularly severe because the
statute of limitations had intervened. MacNeil v. Hearst Corp., 160 F. Supp. 157, 161 (D. Del.
1958). Jardine Estates v. Kappel, 24 N.J. 536, 133 A.2d 1 (1957). See Flora Constr. Co.
v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 307 F.2d 413 (10th Cir. 1962); Nicklaus v. Abel Constr. Co.,
164 Neb. 842, 83 N.W.2d 904 (1957). Cf. Bareco Oil Co. v. Alexander, 33 F. Supp. 32 (N.D.
Iowa 1940).
31. See cases cited notes 30 and 31 supra.
32. Supra notes 3 and 4. The disparity in the stated holdings of the trial and appellate
courts clouds the issue. The tenor of the opinion indicates that the complaint would have
been a nullity even if the corporate president had been a licensed attorney. One case cited in
the opinion, however, implies that in order for a corporation to practice law in person
before a small claims court, as authorized by statute, the officer handling the case must be
an attorney. Tuttle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's Ass'n, 10 Utah 2d 195, 350 P.2d 616 (1960).
The fact that the time for foreclosing the lien had passed was not discussed in the
court's opinion, but stated in the holding.
33. But see In re The Florida Bar, 133 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1961).

